In Richard James Dutton-Forshaw v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 478 (18 September 2015), the FTT found that a property occupied for eight weeks qualified for private residence relief (TCGA 1992 s 222).
The issue was whether private residence relief applied to the sale of his London flat by Mr Dutton-Forshaw in September 2009.
The FTT accepted that Mr Dutton-Forshaw had lived at the flat from 5 August to 26 September 2006, when he had moved to Lymington to look after his daughter upon his ex-wife’s departure to Spain. It wondered therefore whether ‘the nature, quality, length and circumstances’ of occupation made that occupation qualify as ‘residence’ (Goodwin v Curtis [1998] STC 475), observing that ‘the need for permanence or continuity should not be overstated’ (John and Sylvia Regan [2012] UKFTT 569).
The FTT observed that, following the breakdown of a relationship, Mr Dutton-Forshaw had wished, as a single man, to be based in London. Evidence supported this. For instance, he had applied for a parking permit near his London flat. Furthermore, if the London flat had not been his residence between 5 August and 26 September 2006, he would have had no residence during that time. This was possible but would have been a ‘surprising result’. The London flat had therefore been Mr Dutton-Forshaw’s residence during that time.
Why it matters: Cases where a taxpayer has successfully established residence over a short period of time are few and far between. This case may therefore be a useful reference to taxpayers in similar circumstances.
In Richard James Dutton-Forshaw v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 478 (18 September 2015), the FTT found that a property occupied for eight weeks qualified for private residence relief (TCGA 1992 s 222).
The issue was whether private residence relief applied to the sale of his London flat by Mr Dutton-Forshaw in September 2009.
The FTT accepted that Mr Dutton-Forshaw had lived at the flat from 5 August to 26 September 2006, when he had moved to Lymington to look after his daughter upon his ex-wife’s departure to Spain. It wondered therefore whether ‘the nature, quality, length and circumstances’ of occupation made that occupation qualify as ‘residence’ (Goodwin v Curtis [1998] STC 475), observing that ‘the need for permanence or continuity should not be overstated’ (John and Sylvia Regan [2012] UKFTT 569).
The FTT observed that, following the breakdown of a relationship, Mr Dutton-Forshaw had wished, as a single man, to be based in London. Evidence supported this. For instance, he had applied for a parking permit near his London flat. Furthermore, if the London flat had not been his residence between 5 August and 26 September 2006, he would have had no residence during that time. This was possible but would have been a ‘surprising result’. The London flat had therefore been Mr Dutton-Forshaw’s residence during that time.
Why it matters: Cases where a taxpayer has successfully established residence over a short period of time are few and far between. This case may therefore be a useful reference to taxpayers in similar circumstances.
