In Finanzamt Kyritz v W Peters (Case C-700/17) (18 September 2019), the CJEU found that laboratory services performed by an individual were exempt services of medical care, regardless of the location of performance and of the existence of a ‘confidential relationship’ with the patient.
Mr Peters worked in clinical chemistry and laboratory diagnostics. He provided services to a laboratory company which itself supplied services to doctors working in medical practices, rehabilitation clinics, public health services and hospitals. His services included evaluations to help with diagnoses and assistance with transfusions. The issue was whether Mr Peters was providing exempt medical services under the Principal VAT Directive Art 132(1).
The CJEU first observed that, applying its own case law, the concepts of medical care in Art 132(1)(b) and in Art 132(1)(c) were both intended to cover ‘services that have as their aim the diagnosis, treatment and, in so far as possible, cure of diseases or health disorders’ (De Fruytier (Case C‑334/14)). The court added that the criterion for drawing a distinction between the two exemptions under those provisions was less the nature of the service than the place where it is provided. Art 132(1)(b) covered all services supplied in a hospital environment, while Art 132(1)(c) covered services provided outside such a framework – at the private address of the person providing the care, at the patient’s home or at any other place.
The court also noted that a laboratory is capable of constituting an establishment ‘of a similar nature’ to ‘hospitals’ and ‘centres for medical treatment or diagnosis’ within the meaning of Art 132(1)(b). In addition, it would be contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality to make medical tests prescribed by general practitioners subject to a different VAT scheme depending on where they are carried out. The court concluded that the provision of medical care by Mr Peters was also capable of falling within the scope of the exemption under Art 132(1)(c).
The court, however, rejected the notion that the exemption under Art 132(1)(c) applied only to the provision of medical care within the framework of a confidential relationship between the person providing the care and the person being treated. It noted that cases which pointed to a confidential relationship (e.g. Commission v UK (Case C-383/85)) simply highlighted the difference between Arts 132(1)(b) and 132(1)(c) to define the field of application of the two exemptions.
Why it matters: This case confirms that laboratory services fall within the exemption for medical care, whether or not they are performed at a laboratory, hospital ‘and other similar framework’, and whether or not a ‘confidential relationship’ exists.
In Finanzamt Kyritz v W Peters (Case C-700/17) (18 September 2019), the CJEU found that laboratory services performed by an individual were exempt services of medical care, regardless of the location of performance and of the existence of a ‘confidential relationship’ with the patient.
Mr Peters worked in clinical chemistry and laboratory diagnostics. He provided services to a laboratory company which itself supplied services to doctors working in medical practices, rehabilitation clinics, public health services and hospitals. His services included evaluations to help with diagnoses and assistance with transfusions. The issue was whether Mr Peters was providing exempt medical services under the Principal VAT Directive Art 132(1).
The CJEU first observed that, applying its own case law, the concepts of medical care in Art 132(1)(b) and in Art 132(1)(c) were both intended to cover ‘services that have as their aim the diagnosis, treatment and, in so far as possible, cure of diseases or health disorders’ (De Fruytier (Case C‑334/14)). The court added that the criterion for drawing a distinction between the two exemptions under those provisions was less the nature of the service than the place where it is provided. Art 132(1)(b) covered all services supplied in a hospital environment, while Art 132(1)(c) covered services provided outside such a framework – at the private address of the person providing the care, at the patient’s home or at any other place.
The court also noted that a laboratory is capable of constituting an establishment ‘of a similar nature’ to ‘hospitals’ and ‘centres for medical treatment or diagnosis’ within the meaning of Art 132(1)(b). In addition, it would be contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality to make medical tests prescribed by general practitioners subject to a different VAT scheme depending on where they are carried out. The court concluded that the provision of medical care by Mr Peters was also capable of falling within the scope of the exemption under Art 132(1)(c).
The court, however, rejected the notion that the exemption under Art 132(1)(c) applied only to the provision of medical care within the framework of a confidential relationship between the person providing the care and the person being treated. It noted that cases which pointed to a confidential relationship (e.g. Commission v UK (Case C-383/85)) simply highlighted the difference between Arts 132(1)(b) and 132(1)(c) to define the field of application of the two exemptions.
Why it matters: This case confirms that laboratory services fall within the exemption for medical care, whether or not they are performed at a laboratory, hospital ‘and other similar framework’, and whether or not a ‘confidential relationship’ exists.
