So, there’s nothing overly new in the Supreme Court’s judgment in HMRC v Professional Game Match Officials [2024] UKSC 29 (as reported in last week’s edition): just clarifications and a ratification of the principles laid down in April 2022 Court of Appeal decision in Atholl House [2022] EWCA Civ 501 (which is perhaps unsurprising, as it’s the same ex-Court of Appeal judge, Lord Richards, who was promoted to the Supreme Court).
So, a status assessment has three limbs, as per Ready Mixed Concrete [1968] 2 QB 497:
limb one: personal service (including mutuality);
limb two: control (sufficient); and
limb three: other factors, then an evaluative decision.
On limb one, we know that a right of substitution maybe not be conclusive (see Pimlico Plumbers [2018] UKSC 29 and ‘dominant purpose’), and for mutuality, it’s just payment for work (for example, an irreducible minimum). The argument about an ongoing obligation to offer/accept throughout isn’t needed for tax cases.
On limb two, there just needs to be some control, not across all areas – and it can be incidental. The ‘sufficient framework of control’ is a very low bar. It’s an almost meaningless test.
As regards limb three, all other relevant factors can be considered, along with the nature of the mutual obligations and the extent of control.
The ruling is really just a restating of the principles in Atholl House, ratified by the Supreme Court.
The court remitted the case back to the First-tier Tribunal, to make the final decision.
Finally, the status case law is not in a state of flux. It hasn’t been since April 2022.
Home >Articles > More on the Supreme Court’s decision in PGMOL
More on the Supreme Court’s decision in PGMOL
No new law, just clarifications.
So, there’s nothing overly new in the Supreme Court’s judgment in HMRC v Professional Game Match Officials [2024] UKSC 29 (as reported in last week’s edition): just clarifications and a ratification of the principles laid down in April 2022 Court of Appeal decision in Atholl House [2022] EWCA Civ 501 (which is perhaps unsurprising, as it’s the same ex-Court of Appeal judge, Lord Richards, who was promoted to the Supreme Court).
So, a status assessment has three limbs, as per Ready Mixed Concrete [1968] 2 QB 497:
limb one: personal service (including mutuality);
limb two: control (sufficient); and
limb three: other factors, then an evaluative decision.
On limb one, we know that a right of substitution maybe not be conclusive (see Pimlico Plumbers [2018] UKSC 29 and ‘dominant purpose’), and for mutuality, it’s just payment for work (for example, an irreducible minimum). The argument about an ongoing obligation to offer/accept throughout isn’t needed for tax cases.
On limb two, there just needs to be some control, not across all areas – and it can be incidental. The ‘sufficient framework of control’ is a very low bar. It’s an almost meaningless test.
As regards limb three, all other relevant factors can be considered, along with the nature of the mutual obligations and the extent of control.
The ruling is really just a restating of the principles in Atholl House, ratified by the Supreme Court.
The court remitted the case back to the First-tier Tribunal, to make the final decision.
Finally, the status case law is not in a state of flux. It hasn’t been since April 2022.
